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Abstract 
Cities cLnd gOyernrrLents spent a trernendous amount of money to ease traffic congestion~ 
but the problems are yet unsolved. The difficulties are well-known: increase of costs and 
time spent on travelling in cities; noise nuisance. air pollution, vibration; increase of urban 
accident rates: deforming land use patterns. 
Recent research suggests to apply some form of Road Pricing as an important 
tool among many others to manc.ge demand on motorized traffic. Road Pricing may 
be effective as it reduces costs of traffic: regulates and reduces car use in peak hours 
and pricing contributes to maintaining better environmental and living conditions in city 
cen tres. 
Road Pricing system should be included within a comprehensive Land Use and 
Transport Policy. 
Car ownership in Budapest will double to about 400 cars/lOOO inhabitants within 
30 years. It seems clear that some regulation and restriction on car use cannot be avoided. 
Simultaneous, coordinated elements of traffic demand management in Budapest may be 
the following: land use policy: development of public transport; area wide traffic control 
and route guidance systems: parking policy; other instruments and Road Pricing as a 
major tool to manage demand for car traffic. 
There are several reasonable solutions how to locate charging stations in Budapest. 
In the far future it seems necessary to charge drivers entering the city area within the MO 
circular motorway. 
In the first phase outer cordoll may be established in line of 'Hungarian Ringroad' 
after its southern end with 'La.gyminyosi Bridge' across the River Danube will have been 
completed. On the 'Buda' side cordon can be put on the ring road (that cannot be so 
complete as on the 'Pest' side). and additional charging stations can be located on the 
Danube Bridges. This preliminary suggestion must be controlled and changed by results 
of precise and detailed application of traffic models, and interdisciplinary preparation. 
KeYW01'ds: Demand management road pricing, congestion pricing, traffic management, 
urban transportation. 
Introduction 
The rapid development of urban transportation, the fast growth of level 
of car ownership greatly contribute to the development of cities and, as 
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a whole, improve the quality of life of people, living in urban areas. The 
increase of mobility gives a number of advantages to individuals and to 
families: helps to develop cities thus the ,,vhole economy. However, the 
increase of traffic causes severe difficulties as well. Cities and governments 
spent a tremendous amount of money to ease traffic congestion, but the 
problems are yet unsolved. The difficulties are well known: 
increase of costs and time spent on travelling in cities; 
noise nuisance, air pollution, vibration; 
increase of urban accident rates (especially in Eastern Europe); 
deforming land use patterns by occupation of more and more territory 
for traffic purposes. 
Unlimited motorized traffic in cities threatens people's health, quality 
of life, so it threatens the city and its normal operation as well. 
More and more experts agree on this recognition recently. Congestion 
itself is not a reasonable solution to regulate traffic demand in cities at peak 
time. As a conclusion V'le have to accept that some form of traffic demand 
management or some form of restriction is needed according to location 
and time. 
Specialists d d"te developed world are seeking the conditions, instru-
ments and rnethGds to reach an acceptable balance between the different 
requirements. Recent research suggests to apply some form of Road Pric-
ing - as ;oUl important tool among many others - to manage demand on 
motorized traffic. According to theory and according to limited practice 
Road PriciEg may be effec~ive: 
1 It reducsG costs of traffic for indiyiduals, for groups and for the society. 
2. It can reguiate arrd reduce car use in peak hours at formerly congested 
locatwns di"ertll1g some traffic to public transport and cycling. 
Road pn.::iug also encourages pedestrccUl traffic and influences modal 
-split hy reduction of car use. 
3. Road contributes to I11aintaining better environmental and 
living conditions in cities and especially in city while it viorks 
with price mechanism avoiding bureaucratic restriction with its dis-
advantages [1, 2,3]. 
Road Pricing System should be included within a comprehensive Land 
L se and Transport Policy. The System should operate in harmony with 
the other elements of the Policy to play its role in urban traffic demand 
management [4]. However, misuse of Road Pricing may be become a dan-
gerou8 tool to raise money for the state budget. This misuse surely causes 
serious public resistance and discredits transport policy. 
This topic is covered by a number of Studies and Research Reports. 
Some cooperation programmes of the European Community also deal with 
the problem [5]. 
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Principles of Road Pricing Systems 
The idea of Road Pricing was born at the beginning of the sixties. The 
first comprehensive study was made by the 'Smeed Committee' in London 
in 1962. Scandinavian, Japanese, Dutch reports came a bit later. Road 
Pricing has two main objectives: 
1. To harmonize traffic demand and supply for any mode of transporta-
tion, taking into account mobility needs, environmental conditions, 
and minimizing total costs of society. 
2. To collect extra money, for road and transportation improvements. 
Recently urban road ner."I",orks are becoming extremely overcongested. 
According to relevant traffic forecasts car ownership and demand for car 
use increases. As reasonable possibilities to increase capacity usually give 
smaller capacity in peak hours than demand, it seems impossible to relieve 
congestion by traditional technical measures. Sometimes these technical 
measures cannot be used because of the historic structure of cities; so 
congestion becomes constant, pollution increases over tolerable thresholds 
[6,7,8]. 
To handle that situation two measures can be used: 
a) Increasing costs should be paid mainly by those who use the congested 
transportation network of the city in peak hours; 
b) Traffic demand and modal split should be influenced in order to ensure 
acceptable environmental conditions for people. 
Public transport, pedestrian traffic and cycling should be developed. 
and encouraged while car use should be regulated and even restricted ac-
cording to time and place with the help of price mechanism. Appropriate 
use of Road Pricing (Congestion Pricing) seems to be a suitable instru-
ment to improve the present situation and to avoid the possible future 
consequences of 'do-nothing' options. Certainly the use of Road Pricing 
must be coordinated with the comprehensive land use and transport pol-
icy of the city and the region. The applied technology of Road Pricing 
should be technically simple, easy to understand for drivers and people. 
Its operation must not disturb traffic and life of the city. 
The principle of Road Pricing is: The road user pays for costs caused 
to other people. Efficiency increases by this, as trips generated have more 
benefits than costs, The benefit consists of the revenue collected, the time 
and cost saved and the more efficient road use by less congestion, The 
majority of travellers gains by the system; the losers are those who pay 
more and receive only slightly better traffic conditions, and those who 
make less trips than earlier, without Road Pricing they would have done. 
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The system is theoretically not ne\\'. Specialists support it as the 
revenue collected can finance further deveiopments for the benefit of the 
whole community. System performance undoubtedly improves. 
However, difficulties and public resistance occur, when Road Pricing 
is to be implemented. The benefits should be used by the 'Rule of Three' 
(Fig. 1). One third of road space saved can be given back for environmental 
purposes to increase green area; one third can improve public transport 
with bus lanes or by other means of route separation: one third can improve 
traffic conditions for remaining motorized traffic thus reducing pollution as 
well. (GOODYVI:" 1991 [9] ). Revenue collected can be spent for the same 
fieids, for environment; for public transport (for better vehicles, better 
passenger information, for subsidy); and for improving traffic conditions 
by constructing new roads, implementing route guidance system, or by 
other means. 
Use of Road space 
/\\ ,",i,comeot 
(8tra . \ 
\ traffic )------1 
Speed 
Use of Revenue 
transport 
L The 'Rule of Three' allocation or benefit::; c,f road d'fw.-ino· (left) rC'leased 
road space and (right 1 revenup 
By this approach more groups may feel that gain and less that 
they lose. 'The Rule of Three' is not a rigid standard, but symbolizes a 
balanced rate, that is easy to understand, and gets public support. Social 
and political support, coherence with land use and transport policy of city 
are very important to introduce a Road Pricing System. 
An ideal Road Pricing System is a flexible complex system. Drivers, 
car users can pay all their costs as tolls, parking fees and petrol costs in the 
same way. A special credit card may be suitable to meet these requirements 
[10]. 
Road Pricing has two basic forms in international experience: 
1. The driver pays when he crosses a certain cordon line; enters and/or 
leaves the cordon. 
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2. The driver pays according to the distance travelled on the tolled (in-
ner) side of the cordon line. Earlier suggestions were dropped to pay 
according to time spent in the tolled area by car as the safety conse-
quences were estimated to be severe. 
Some International Examples, Experiments 
and Plans about Introduction of Road 
Hong ]{ ong. The First Experiment to Introduce 
an Electronic Road Pricing System (ER PS) 
Electronic Road Pricing Systems could be introduced as the technology of 
Automatic Vehicle Identification had been w'-orked out the 
contribution of Transport and Road Research Laboratory (TRRL) of the 
United Kingdom. On the basis of TRRL research results achieved at about 
1970 Plessey Control Ltd. developed the technology further. However, at 
this level AVI was not completely reliable. Difficulties occurred with certain 
vehicle movements (weaving for example), with identification of different 
types of vehicles, etc. 
The progress in the development of microelectronics made it possible 
to analyse the subject again. 
When the feasibility study of Hong Kong Electronic Road Pricing 
System was carried out in the early eighties, it became clear that the re-
quired reliability may already be achieved at reasonable costs. During the 
experimental operation of Hong Kong ERPS in 1983-85 Automatic Vehicle 
Identification and the whole system proved to work well and reliably [11, 
12, 13]. That meant that ERPS is technically feasible anywhere in the 
world, though the social and political doubts remained alive. Due to htese 
doubts and to local specialities the operation of the System was suspended. 
Singapore 
An A REA Licensing System (ALS) was introduced in Singapore in 1975. 
The main aim was to reduce car traffic in peak hours in the city centre. The 
system contains 29 stations for toll collection. Originally drivers entering 
the cordon between 7.30-11 a.m. were to pay tolls, but later the toll period 
was extended for the afternoon peak, 4.30- 7.00 p.m. The entering fee was 
1.7 Singapore $ per day or 35 Singapore $ per month (approximately 3 US$ 
and 55 US$). Drivers of buses, lorries emergency, vehicles, and 'high occu-
pancy vehicles' (cars with 4 or more people) do not have to pay the toll. 
'Stickers' are sold at post offices and they are to be stuck on the windscreen 
inside the vehicle. Technically the system is quite simple. Control is made 
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at toll gates. Those travelling without sticker are registered and fined by 
the police. 
As a result of Area Licensing System car use in peak hours sharply 
decreased, while in off-peak it increased. As a total traffic decreased by 
20 %. The number of High Occupancy Vehicles (HOVs) doubled. Business 
in the center was not badly effected. Authorities in Singapore are consider-
ing to develop their Area Licensing System to an Electronic Road Pricing 
System. [1, 2]. 
Bergen (Norway) 
Since January 1986, toll is collected in the city of Bergen for the use of 
cars entering the central area. The city of Bergen has 200 000 inhabitants. 
Toll collecting plazas have been built on six major radial routes (Fig. 2). 
Tolls are paid for about 50000 vehicles daily from 06 o'clock to 22 o'clock 
Monday to Friday. The basic aim of implementing the system was to 
collect money for construction of new roads and for better maintenance of 
the road network. That also means that congestion relief, environmental 
improvement were secondary considerations [14J. 
Tollgates 
=== Tunnel 
~CBO -area 
Fig. 2. Major roads leading to Bergen's Central District, showing the location of the 
toll gates [14] 
Toll for a passanger car is 5 NO K (5 Norwegian Krones = 55 Hungarian 
Forints = 0.70 US $). Lorries pay double rate, buses are free of charge 
(Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Tolls in Bergen, 1986 [14] (1 NOK = 11 HUF = 0.15 US S) 
Light vehicles Heavy vehicles 
NOK NOK HUF 
Pass. annual 1.100 12,100 2.200 24.200 
Pass. 6 months 57.5 6.:300 1,150 12,600 
Pass. monthly 100 1.100 200 2.200 
20 pieces of prepaid 
tickets price/piece 4 .. 50 .sO 9 100 
ticket for one 
occasion .5 .55 10 110 
" rIll€' 200 2.200 200 2.200 
(;[0:3:3- Ilevenue 195;6 .s.s million :\OK 6O.) miliion HlT 
Cost 1980 S.0 million ;\OK 9.s million HeF 
;\et Revenue 46.-1 million NOK 510 million IHT 
Since 1986 the system works well. Traffic did not. increase inside 
the cordon line ",,-hile traffic increased wit.h 7-8 % generally in Norway. 
Financial results have also proved to be good (Table 2). Toll plazas cio not. 
have bad effect.s on congest.ion. 
Gross Re\'enue 
Cost 
Included constr. 
of toll plazas 
;\et Revenue 
Table 2 
Financial results in Bergen 1986 
planned 
mill. \"OK 
28 
fact 
mill. ;\OK mill. HFF 
.5.5 130.5 
S.6 9.5 
46.4 .510 
Oslo, Trondheim 
10 
19 
81 
The capit.al of Norway, Oslo, int.roduced Road Pricing in February 1990. 
20 t.oll plazas were built at a distance of 4-6 km from the city center. 200 
000 vehicles enter the Central Business District (CBD) area daily including 
through traffic, as there is no by-pass. The system is similar t.o the one in 
Bergen. The most important difference is that the system in Oslo can be 
developed to an Electronic Road Pricing System. 
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Trondheim introduced Road Pricing in autumn 1991. 
Other Cities Preparing Road Pricing 
The so-called Randstad - the more and more unifying conurbation of Am-
sterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht in the Netherlands, Stock-
holm, Copenhagen, London and Cambridge are also planning to introd uce 
Road Pricing. Application of forecasts and various traffic models made it 
clear that only a package of measures included Road Pricing can manage 
traffic demand to a level that is environmentally and socially tolerable in 
these cities [15,16,17,18,1]. 
Summary of International Experience and Comprehensive 
Studies Concerning Road Pricing 
Since the 'Smeed Report', 1964 it has been widely recognized among ex-
perts that: 
Capacity, supply for transport demands at a certain time and location 
cannot be sufficient. The traditional reaction to the challenge - as to 
construct roads with a capacity enough for demand at peak hours, peak 15 
minutes - failed. This solution has proved to be insufficient according to 
environmental 
- land use 
- economical considerations. 
Other solutions (better and/or cheaper public transport; pedestrianization, 
traffic calming; decentralization; tax measures; parking fees and restric-
tions) have given some preliminary results, but generally could not have 
solved the problem. Every solution has had bad side effects, participants 
of traffic invented some tricks to overcome restrictions. 
It should be emphasized that motorization is a pleasant source of state 
budget revenue all over the world. However, after general tax levels were 
decided by the parliament, real costs should be analyzed in details carefully. 
The widely spread view - that environmental and other damages, losses 
should be covered by tax revenue - is false. In certain cases costs - caused 
by users of congested roads - are much higher than the price paid including 
tax. Any form of cross-subsidy, cross financing may cause economical and 
social inefficiency. 
The Smeed Report and some other studies proved that car drivers 
entering an already congested slow speed (5-15 km/h) traffic flow, cause 
considerable extra (marginal, differential) costs to other road users [13J. 
(Fig. 3, 4, 5). These marginal costs include: 
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1. Time loss of other drivers and passengers, 
2. Other extra cost of other drivers, vehicles (higher fuel consumption, 
higher vehicle operating costs, longer diverted routes, etc.) 
3. Extra costs of lower speed public transport. Time loss of public trans-
port passengers. 
4. Direct costs of environmental damages (costs of protection, of fines, 
etc.) and indirect costs (worse living environment; value loss of 
houses, flats, pieces of land; illnesses, diseases; etc.) 
Traffic flow (q),xl03(pcu/h) 
Fig. S. Traffic flow q: p.CU./il) spced (1' :klll/h) diagrams 
k - thp well-knO\\'!1 HC\! diagram 
I - a simplified form of HC'\l diagram 
III - l' = Cl - bq lin,oar function: in next example we use 
Cl = .50 km/h 
b 0.01 km/p.c.ll. 
According to thcse values when: 
q 0 p.eu./h " .sO km/h 
q = .5000 p.c.ll./h " = 0 km/h 
(2.500 p.c.u./h/lane) 
The example illustrates linc·ar speed-flow relations on a two lane one-way urban 
arterial. (f-.!odified exalllplc> of SALTER [19]) 
Fig. 'l and Table 4 illustrate the magnitude of differential costs mentioned 
above. At the current level of technology it is already theoretically possible 
to make those participants of traffic pay that cause these extra costs. 
Using a simplified example: 
Real costs are very high, when somebody uses his car et 4 p.m., Friday 
on 'High Street' of a metropolis. 
Costs are lower if somebody uses his car at 4 p.m. Friday in the 
suburbs or in the country. 
Costs are also lower, when somebody uses his car at 5 a.m. Sunday 
on 'High Street' of a metropolis. 
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Traffic flow (q),p.c.u.lh 
Fig. 4. Traffic flow (q: p.c.u.jh) Travel time (i: h/km) diagram. Linear function m 
of Pig. 3 is used. In developed countries traffic flow - travel time traffic flow 
tra\·el costs diagrams are practically similar. as travel time is the most important 
factor of travel cost. 
Extra cost is a function of time and location. Earlier forms of price 
and tax mechanism do not handle that problem. Higher petrol tax may 
restrict economically and socially useful traffic in the country, or holiday 
traffic; Higher parking fees do not affect cars using private parking places, 
and do not affect through traffic. 
Only Electronic Road Pricing System (ERPS) may give a theoretically 
true answer for the problem. Extra price must be paid at location and time 
where and when extra cost occurs. Efforts to make that system work are 
applicable thanks to current level of microelectronics and technology: 
Toll collection does not affect, does not disturb traffic; 
Cost of ERPS is fairly low; 
Administration can be solved; 
Drivers avoiding to pay, may be fined efficiently, etc. 
'Road Pricing is an attempt to change the principle that highways 
should be treated as "y-elfare services that is financed out of taxes to the 
principle that they should be treated as public utility services for which 
charges are made. It has been argued that road pricing is democratic 
because it is the tripmaker who makes the decision as to whether or not 
the trip should be made at the given price rather than a government body 
making a decision that his trip was in the interests of the community' [14] 
(Salter, 1989). Application of market mechanism in this field helps to make 
better use of resources for individuals, for groups and for the society as well; 
efficiency improves, social costs decrease [20]. 
Advantages and disadvantages (both real and imagined) of ERPS have 
been widely analysed by specialists. Most arguments against the system 
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Demand traffic flow (q), x103 (p.c.u.l h ) 
Fig . .5. Typical demand curves 
q Traffic demand traffic flow [p.c.u./hour] 
p Travel cost or price [IH'F/p.c,u.km = Hungarian Forints/p.c.u.km] typical 
demand curves 
q = f(p) p = f-Jlq) = f-dD) 
q = traffic flow: D = demand 
q = a bp: linear 
q = !f;- : hyperbolic 
h' I' q= p,:: <"p-, 
were taken into consideration, but it seems that 'old' market mechanism is 
a much better tool for traffic demand management than congestion itself. 
However, public acceptance of ERPS needs careful preparation, The most 
important advices and experiences are the following [21]: 
1. ERPS should be an element of an attractive, promising transport 
policy package, 
2. Before introduction detailed analysis is needed about possible reac-
tions, consequences. Application of comprehensive transport models 
is needed to forecast future trends. 
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Fig. 6. The change of road user benefit (con;;lI11Wr :iurpllls) 
as a result of road improvement. 
? - demand or traffic flow [p.c.lI·/ll = 
p - cost or benefit of road use 
)IlT /p.c.u.km = Hungarian 
a original average cost curve 
b - new average cost curve 
q original cost; intersecting point of curn',; 'a' and 'd' 
(Jj - original traffic flow 
(':2 - new cost after improvement: ;ntp,"'''''-';'''' point of C'Jrws 'b' alld 'd', C2 < C1 
(]2 - traffic flow after roe.d improvement, !j2 < Cj 
q'l. ql g('nerat~d traffic 
B1 CO!lSUlnCf surplus in siatp 
B2 consumer surplus after road lllil)[,,:)\"'!!llc!lt 
B:3 = consumer surplus if a tor t = Cl - c:; i:i introduced 
in mo:" case:, B3 > B2 as usually area (':;J;.F,Cj >ar<;" E,r,B 
rl(q)dq - clq; 
1-1 - C2'!1 
B3 C:3Q1 
3, Even a good and reasonable package of measures can only slow down 
increase of total traffic flows, Reduction of traffic in real terms is 
rarely possible, 
Some informations of present and future ERP Systems are summarized in 
Table 3. Economical background is shown in Figs 3-7 and in Table 4 with 
an example. 
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Table 4 
A yerage cost and system short run marginal costs of road users 
as a function of traffic flow [19]. (Look at Fig. 7 as well) 
:2 :3 -I .s 
q c" Cl' Co 
pc.u/h km/h ft/pc.u/km Ft/pc.u/km Ft/pc.u/km 
.50-q/l00 G.:2'i+ 187'i0 Iv 2 6.:2.5+3'.5/v (:3)-( -t) 
Traffic Speed Differential Private cost Costs of other 
flow cost cost road users 
0 .50 ]:3.,.5 n.'.5 0.00 
200 ·18 l-l.:39 14.06 0.:3:3 
.500 ·1.') 1.5 . .5 1 I·L59 0.92 
000 .+0 1'.3-l 1.S.6~3 1.,1 
1.500 T'i :21 .. 56 16.96 -l.60 
+1700 :3:3 n.";6 1,.61 ·).8·) 
1,00x n.·16 
2000 :30 27.08 U~.'.'i .s.3:3 
+2090 20.1 28.:39 lf1.l4 0.2.5 
2.500 25 :36.2.5 2! .2.5 1.5.00 
:3000 20 5:U2 2.5.00 28.12 
·!OOO 10 I 9:.L ,.5 -13.7.5 1.50.00 
-\.500 5 ,.56.:25 L2.5 6,500 
-!900 18756.2.5 381.25 1.33,.5.00 
The Possibility and Necessity 
to Road Pricing in Budapest 
q.D 
pc.u/h 
-l0000 Ft/cl' 
Demand 
2S-l-1 
:271:2 
:!'i6 
:2360 
:2271 
1,04x 
:2 1:3-1 
2000-+-
1.<;';2 
1600 
91-1 
-192 
10.5 
Possibility foT' Traffic Demand Management in Budapest 
69 
Modest estimations expect that car ownership in Budapest will double to 
about 400 cars/lOOO inhabitants within 30 years. It is difficult to handle 
that problem both for car use and for parking as the present situation 
is considered to be unbearable by the public. It seems clear that some 
regulation and restriction on car use cannot be avoided. Simultaneous, 
coordinated elements of traffic demand management in Budapest may be 
the following: 
1. A land use policy that influences and if possible reduces traffic de-
mand. (Separation of housing and labour areas in the past increased 
traffic demand above reasonable level). 
2. The development of pu blic transport and its level of service especially 
in the central area. 
3. Introduction of sophisticated area wide traffic control and route guid-
ance systems with priority for public transport. 
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Fig. 7. Average cost and marginal cost curves as a fUllctiol! of traffic flow 
Introducing atoll of.j.B.') HUFjp.c.u.km 
(n.46 Hl'F 17.61 HUF=5.8.5 HUF: differential cost - average cost) 
(Look at Table .j as wel!) 
4. Parking policy in accordance with Public Transport and Road Pricing 
System . 
. 5. Other instruments to reduce car traffic speed reduction; Through traf-
fic restriction; Priority for pedestrians and cyclists. 
6. Road Pricing as a major tool to manage demand for car traffic. 
The Role of Road P,icing in Budapest 
Road pricing may have two major functions in Budapest: 
1. To manage and restrict demand for individual car use. 
2. To form additional revenue for cost of transportation development. 
Road Pricing can be the most powerful instrument to influence car use as it 
regulates traffic demand according to time and location; 
ensures the operation of market mechanism, and in this way influences 
modal split and traffic demand to a socially better state; 
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forms a flexible tool that can follow changing needs with the change 
of location, time limits and toll levels; 
has low operation costs, can be automated and does not disturb traffic. 
ERPS can give additional traffic informations; 
has a controlling and enforcement method, that fines drivers cheating 
the system; 
is easy to understand, and gives advantage to every major road user 
group. 
The other important argument for Road Pricing is that it establishes 
fund to develop and operate the total transportation system. This fund is 
collected in a socially fair way; those contribute to the costs mainly who use 
the congested sections, junctions very frequently right in peak hours. Those 
contribute most, for whom expensive investments to increase capacity are 
decided, those viho enjoy the benefits of these investments. As mentioned 
in above other forms of taxation do not give that result. 
The public may accept the system and considers it fair, if revenue 
collected will be really used for transport development, and Road Pricing 
does not become a new form of taxation. The revenue collected should 
be used to improve public transport, to help pedestrians and cyclists with 
better facilities, to improve environmental conditions and to develop the 
road network and its operation. In this case the majority will gain, and 
losers will be compensated. It is also necessary to make an agreement - with 
participation of inhabitants, car owners, environmental movements, local 
authorities and Central Government - about the structure and quantity of 
taxes levied on motorization, and this agreement should be legislated by 
Parliament. 
According to experience even with Hungarian income levels a Road 
Pricing System would be profitable. Costs for equipment may return within 
2-3 years. Foreign capital would probably be interested in such a project 
especially in form of concession. 
It should be emphasized that Road Pricing is a major tool to ensure 
tolerable environmental conditions in the city by reducing congestion and 
pollution. The system is fair as the polluter pays principle is put into 
practice. Those who ca.use more pollution by travelling in congestion pay 
more. 
Experience in Hong Kong, studies about Randstad, Stockholm, Cam-
bridge, London convincingly prove that Electronic Road Pricing is the best, 
most efficient form of any kind of Road Pricing System. ERPS can be the 
best solution for Budapest as \vell, especiallyby keeping future demand for 
car use at reasonably low level, close to present conditions. Foreign expe-
rience shows that to slow down the increase of car use is much easier, than 
to reduce car use that once has already grown from present (about 30 % 
/2 
car use-70 % public transport) modal split rate to internal (50 %-50 %) 
modal split. 
Possible location of Electronic Road Pricing System in Budapest 
BUDAPEST 
Fig. 8. PC";fiiiJ\p location of CRI'S cordon liJlP with charging stations in phase 1 in Bu-
dapest (around year 2000) 
There are several reasoDable solutions how to locate charging stations in 
Budapest. In the far future it seems necessary to charge drivers entering 
the city area within MO circular motorway. Charge would be smaller close 
to MO in the outskirts, and would increase by set of other charging sta-
tions closer and closer to the city centre. In peak hours every charging 
station would be in operation, in off peak charge can also be varied in a 
flexible way in accordance with traffic demand, policy objectives and local 
conditions. Ho\vever, the total charging system should remain simple and 
understandable for drivers. Table 5. shows a preliminary example about 
possible charge levels and system operation modes. 
The system can be put into operation gradually in two - three phases. 
III the first phase outer cordon may be established in line of 'Hungaria 
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BUDAPEST 
Fig. 9. Possible location of ERPS cordon line with charging stations in phase 2 in Bu-
dapest (around year 2020) 
Ringroad' after its southern end with 'Lagymanyosi Bridge' across the River 
Danube will have been completed. On the 'Buda' side cordon can be put 
on the ring road (that cannot be so complete as on the 'Pest' side), and 
additional charging stations can be located on the Danube Bridges. An 
additional inner cordon may be established at 'Small Ring' roughly around 
district V., around the historical City. Fig. 8 shows Phase 1 with possible 
cordon lines and location of charging stations. Fig. 9 shows a possibility 
for the final phase. 
The Electronic Road Pricing System mentioned above has a pre-
condition that the majority of vehicles is equipped with the 'smart card', 
while for foreign vehicles and for vehicles from the countryside a sticker 
can be bought that operates as a season ticket for a shorter period. Sug-
gestions of Professor HILLS (1991) how to implement such a system can be 
useful in Budapest as well [18]. It should be emphasized that careful traffic 
model experiments, car-use-price elasticity studies must be made before 
implementing the System. 
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Table 5 
Possible charge levels and operation modes of ERPS in Budapest 
(Preliminary example) 
Operation mode of Average 
Charge Time charging stations charge collected 
level 
1. 
2. 
.1. 
of application 
Environmental 
e!nergency 
Peak period 
Monday-Friday 
6-9 a.m. 
2-6 p.m. 
Weekdays 
off peak 
9 a.Il1.-2 p.m. 
6-9 p.n] 
9 p.m.-6 a.m. 
weekdays and 
Saturdays 
Sundays all day 
in City cent er 
all in 
operation 
all in 
operation 
all in 
opera! ion 
all in 
operation 
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